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ABSTRACT
In collaboration with the Authority for the Financial Markets in the Nether-
lands, we manipulate the content of official letters that instruct financial in-
termediaries to submit a mandatory self-assessment. As part of the Registered
Report Process, we submitted our hypotheses, experimental procedure, and
planned statistical analyses before data collection. We predicted that a request
indicating a supportive regulatory attitude has a positive effect on report-
ing quality on average. We also predicted this effect to be stronger for small
firms and for firms with a long-term orientation, and to become negative for
firms with a short-term orientation. Planned analyses show that a support-
ive letter reduced reporting quality unless firms had a long-term orientation,
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supporting the moderating influence of time horizon, but providing no sup-
port for the expected average effect or for moderation by firm size.
JEL codes: G28; K42; M48
Keywords: reporting quality; responsive regulation; support; time horizon
1. Introduction
Across diverse regulatory settings, authorities request proprietary informa-
tion from firms as part of their monitoring and supervision strategies. This
is particularly relevant in contexts in which there is a significant informa-
tion gap between the firm and the authority (Besanko and Sappington
[1987], Pautz and Rinfret [2016]). In the contexts of tax, customs, finan-
cial, or environmental regulations, for instance, firms are commonly re-
quested to complete and submit mandatory self-assessments in which they
report sensitive information. Evidently, the effectiveness of the authorities’
supervision strategies directly depends on the quality of the information
that firms provide (Peeters [2006]). Imprecise, incomplete, or untimely in-
formation obstructs monitoring and makes supervision more difficult, time
consuming, and costly.
Self-reporting commonly involves a series of actions, which include
gathering detailed information, completing extensive questionnaires, and
meeting tight deadlines (Ernst and Young [2012]). The quality of the infor-
mation reported to the authorities is determined by these actions, as they
directly influence precision and comprehensiveness, as well as the extent to
which firms voluntarily report additional information. In this sense, report-
ing quality can be conceptualized as a behavioral outcome that depends on
firms’ motivation and capacity to attain high reporting quality.
Because effective supervision benefits greatly from high reporting
quality, a fundamental question is whether authorities can exert influence
to improve reporting quality. This is a non-trivial problem, as it may not be
sufficiently addressed through deterrence (i.e., by threatening firms with
penalties for not reporting information with the highest level of quality).
Firms may comply with minimum reporting requirements, and yet provide
low reporting quality (e.g., by reporting approximate figures). Establishing
whether low reporting quality sufficiently reflects reality—and whether it
deserves a punishment—imposes additional challenges for the authorities.
From a supervisory standpoint, the core problem is that authorities may
explicitly request the highest level of reporting quality, but in practice may
have limited resources to monitor and assess the level of reporting quality
itself.
Following the literature on responsive regulation (Braithwaite [2003,
2007]), one way in which authorities might be able to influence report-
ing quality is by signaling a supportive regulatory strategy toward firms.
The rationale is that, as the strategy focuses more on guidance and
support, firms’ motivations to attain high reporting quality increase. The
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concept of responsive regulation establishes that there are distinct types
of regulatory strategies, which vary in terms of how supportive they are
(Braithwaite [2007]). A strategy that focuses less on deterrence and more
on education and service delivery motivates firms to share information.
Moreover, an educational approach helps firms to “make sense” of what
is requested from them and encourages compliance (Fairman and Yapp
[2005]). In this sense, support enhances the perception that the author-
ity is fair and trustworthy, and prompts reciprocity from at least a fraction
of supervised firms (Alford and Speed [2006]). Overall, there are distinct
reasons to expect a positive effect of a supportive strategy on how firms
respond to the authority’s requests, including the request to provide high-
quality information.
Because not all firms can be visited at the same time, authorities have
limited options to present themselves as helpful and exert this type of sup-
portive influence at an industry-wide scale. For a large number of firms,
interactions with the authority are constrained to infrequent official com-
munications (in the form of formal letters). Taking this point into consid-
eration, in this study we examine whether reporting quality is influenced
by the extent to which official communications reflect a supportive regula-
tory strategy. Our hypothesis is that, as compared to a low support letter, a
high support letter leads to higher reporting quality. We acknowledge, how-
ever, that the strength of the expected effect may vary depending on firms’
specific characteristics and motivations (Braithwaite [2003, 2007]). Hence,
we further hypothesize that the expected effect is weaker for larger firms
(which might be less sensitive to the content of official communications),
stronger for long-term oriented firms (which might see reporting quality as
an investment), and reversed for short-term oriented firms (which might
perceive support as a signal of a weaker enforcement strategy and seize the
opportunity to report low-quality information).
To test these hypotheses, we conduct a field experiment in the regulatory
setting of financial intermediation in the Netherlands. The Authority for
the Financial Markets (AFM), which supervises the financial markets and
financial services providers in this country, granted us permission to intro-
duce an experimental treatment in their 2017 communications. The AFM
employs a supervision instrument called Market Monitor (MM), which is a
mandatory, standardized self-assessment instrument and is sent out to ap-
proximately 7,000 financial intermediaries on a yearly basis. Through this
instrument, firms provide an elaborate amount of sensitive information re-
lated to, for example, financial products offered, specific financial interme-
diation activities, number of employees and customer relationships, as well
as detailed accounting and managerial information. Every year, the AFM
sends three letters to each firm providing information on how to complete
and when to submit the MM.
Based on prior experience, the AFM recognizes that intermediaries vary
in the amount and precision of the information that they report. After a
series of discussions with the AFM, it was jointly determined that there are
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valid reasons to expect that the quality of the reported information can be
influenced by the content of the letters in which firms are instructed to
complete and submit the MM. As a result, we designed a field experiment
in which we employ two distinct sets of letters (which contain information
about the instructions, username, and password required to complete the
MM), and that reflect a regulatory strategy based on low versus high sup-
port. We identify three elements that relate to support, and that can be
manipulated in order to influence firms’ perceptions and reporting behav-
ior. These elements are: accessibility (absence of obstacles or barriers to ask
for help or guidance), purpose (goal alignment between the authority and
the firm), and tone. High support letters emphasize that the regulator is ac-
cessible to provide support on how to complete the MM, identify shared
goals, and have a supportive tone. In contrast, low support letters only in-
dicate where to find information without expressing the willingness of the
regulator to provide support, do not identify shared goals, and have a strict
tone. Our objective is to compare the effects that each set of letters has on
reporting quality, as indicated by comprehensiveness, precision1, and vol-
untary provision of information (i.e., answering non-mandatory questions).
In addition, we examine how the strength of this effect varies with firm size
and time horizon. As part of the Journal of Accounting Research Registered Re-
port Process, we submitted our hypotheses, experimental procedure, and
planned statistical analyses before collecting the data.
Examination of the data as proposed provides partial support for one of
our hypotheses: the high support letter leads to lower reporting quality ex-
cept for long-term oriented firms. Long-term oriented firms (1) on average
provide higher reporting quality than small- and medium-term oriented
firms, and (2) as compared to those firms, show no decrease in reporting
quality after receiving a high support letter. In addition, planned additional
tests incorporating the extensiveness instead of use of voluntary reporting
reveal an antagonistic interaction effect: the high support letter has a posi-
tive (negative) effect for firms with a long (short) time horizon. This effect
supports our third hypothesis, and goes in line with the idea that industry-
wide interventions have heterogeneous effects, which vary across different
firm types. While short-term oriented firms may negatively exploit support
by reducing reporting quality, a long-term orientation appears to prevent
such exploitation from happening and even enhance the hypothesized pos-
itive effect of support on reporting quality. These results can guide regula-
tors on how to target data quality checks, and differentiate regulatory strat-
egy, actions, and official communications based on firms’ characteristics.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. In the empirical
accounting literature, reporting quality is typically examined with respect
to financial accounting reports, using publicly available data (e.g., Biddle,
1 In our proposal, we used the term “accuracy” for this construct. However, the term “preci-
sion” better fits our operationalization of the construct.
THE TONE FROM ABOVE 471
Hilary, and Verdi [2009], Balakrishnan, Core, and Verdi [2014]). In con-
trast, we examine reporting quality in a regulatory context where firms face
the compulsory demand to self-report sensitive information to an authority.
Analyses of regulatory reporting are uncommon, likely due to difficulties
in obtaining access to sensitive and confidential data. Similar to the argu-
ment that financial reporting quality reduces information asymmetry with
investors (Balakrishnan, Core, and Verdi [2014]), high reporting quality
reduces the information asymmetry with the authority, enabling it to better
fulfill its objective of regulatory oversight.
A second contribution relates to how authorities may be able to influ-
ence firms’ reporting quality. In a setting with infrequent contact with firms,
communicating a particular regulatory strategy can have significant impact
on reporting behavior. This highlights the importance of the way in which
authorities present themselves in official communications. We identify an
important boundary condition for the effect of the high support letter, as
it is conditional on firms’ time horizon. Our results show that time hori-
zon is critical in how firms respond to regulatory requests and whether a
support-based approach is effective or even backfires.
Regulators are generally reluctant to participate in field experiments
given the political sensitivity and magnitude of the responsibility associ-
ated with using differential treatments between firms. However, there is
great value in examining these types of questions in regulatory practice,
as there is uncertainty on whether regulation-related questions are suit-
able for lab experiments (Choo, Fonseca, and Myles [2016], Lindeboom,
Van der Klaauw, and Vriend [2016]). Prior field experiments on regulatory
strategies have focused primarily on tax reporting, testing whether commu-
nications reflecting particular regulatory strategies affect tax compliance.
These experiments mainly include theory-based manipulations related to
deterrence and support, such as varying monitoring or punishment levels
(Blumenthal, Christian, and Slemrod [2001], Wenzel and Taylor [2004],
Hasseldine et al. [2007], Ariel [2012], Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler
[2013], Hallsworth [2014], Castro and Scartascini [2015]), and normative
appeals and social persuasion (Torgler [2004], Ariel [2012], Hallsworth
et al. [2017]). Despite the pervasiveness of self-reporting in settings other
than tax regulation, field experiments in these other settings are rare. This
provides much scope for the use of a field experiment to examine the ef-
fects of theory-based manipulations on reporting behavior. In this sense, we
respond to the recent call for field experiments that examine regulatory ef-
fects in practice (Leuz and Wysocki [2016]).
2. Theory and Hypotheses
2.1 SELF-REPORTING
There are several reasons why supervisory authorities may be inter-
ested in employing self-reporting instruments. Seminal theory in this area
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indicates that self-reporting can save costs associated with the effective de-
tection of non-compliance, and reduce uncertainty about punishments for
both the authority and regulated agents (Kaplow and Shavell [1994], Heyes
[2000]). Subsequent theoretical developments have focused on the con-
texts of tax, environmental, and financial regulations, which are encom-
passing and permeate a variety of industries. A common element across the
literature, however, is the emphasis on information asymmetry, whereby au-
thorities have limited access to information about firms’ activities and op-
erations (this is also referred to as an information gap; Baron and Myerson
[1982], Sappington [1982], Besanko and Sappington [1987], Pautz and
Rinfret [2016]). The fundamental problem for authorities is that monitor-
ing is costly, as they have limited capacity and resources to process technical
and extensive information in order to effectively assess whether firms are
failing to comply with regulations. Self-reporting can help reduce infor-
mation asymmetries, and in this sense, it can be seen as a complement of
a given supervisory strategy. As a result, modern regulatory regimes may
transfer control and reporting functions to corporate management (re-
ferred to as “first instance monitoring”), while the final responsibility for
oversight, inspections, and sanctions remains on the side of the authorities
(Parker [2002]).
Self-reporting instruments can differ in terms of whether they are manda-
tory versus voluntary, periodic versus sporadic (submitted only upon re-
quest), completed and submitted in paper versus online, or in terms of
how extensive and detailed they are. In most cases, however, self-reporting
instruments are based on the request of sensitive information, and for this
reason, they tend to be treated as confidential. Self-reporting instruments
can also have limitations. These mainly relate to potential low response
rates (due to, e.g., unclear instructions, incapacity to reach the targeted
population, unmeetable requirements or deadlines), untruthful reporting
or intentional misreporting (Friesen and Gangadharan [2013]), and low
reporting quality (i.e., a level of quality that is insufficient in terms of time-
liness, precision, or completeness). Although untruthful reporting has by
definition low reporting quality, the distinction between these two potential
limitations is fundamental. This is because self-reporting can be truthful,
and yet be limited to the bare minimum that is required by law. For exam-
ple, low reporting quality can involve rough approximations of numerical
or date-related responses, and relate to firms’ unwillingness to answer non-
mandatory questions or provide additional clarifications and perspectives
on a voluntary basis (in, e.g., open-ended questions). For supervisory au-
thorities, high reporting quality is therefore the most desirable outcome.
2.2 REPORTING QUALITY AS A BEHAVIORAL OUTCOME
Self-reporting comprises a series of actions, which broadly relate to prop-
erly registering contact information so that the firm can be reached by the
authorities, reading and understanding the instructions of the self-reported
instrument (on how and when to complete and submit responses),
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requesting information internally (e.g., to different employees or depart-
ments within the firm), aggregating and processing gathered information
(e.g., making calculations or synthetizing evaluations), inputting and re-
viewing responses (by, e.g., board members or heads of departments), and
submitting responses on time.
Reporting quality—in terms of precision, comprehensiveness, and the
provision of voluntary responses—can be affected by any of the above-
mentioned actions, and therefore can be conceptualized as a behavioral
outcome. As such, reporting quality can be explained by firms’ capacity
and motivations to strive for high reporting quality.
2.3 THE POTENTIAL INFLUENCE OF A SUPPORTIVE REGULATORY STRATEGY
This study builds on the theory of responsive regulation (Braithwaite
[2003, 2007]), which establishes that regulation is more effective when dis-
tinct regulatory strategies are properly aligned with corresponding compli-
ance motivations. Regulatory strategies can vary in terms of how intrusive
they are. More intrusive strategies rely more heavily on deterrence (involv-
ing audits, inspections, punishments, and direct control), whereas less in-
trusive strategies rely more heavily on persuasion and education (Healy and
Braithwaite [2006]). One key objective for the authorities, therefore, is to
identify which motivations firms have, and respond accordingly with suit-
able regulatory strategies.
Firms may have economic and non-economic motivations to comply with
regulations (Nielsen and Parker [2012]). Non-economic motivations relate
to social or normative considerations (i.e., giving value to the perceptions of
significant others or being committed to act responsibly—over and above
economic cost-benefit analyses). Abundant research suggests that norma-
tive motivations are enhanced by the perception that the authorities’ rules
and decisions are fair, trustworthy, and legitimate (Malloy [2003], Parker
and Nielsen [2011]).
There are several reasons why a supportive strategy fits well into the con-
text of supervision and self-reporting, and may motivate firms to strive for
high reporting quality. First, a supportive strategy places particular value on
the exchange of information. A regulatory strategy oriented toward educa-
tion and service delivery is expected to motivate firms to share information
and engage in open dialogue with the authority (Braithwaite [2007]). The
focus is not on detecting wrongdoing, but on using information to attain
more important goals. Firms are treated not with suspicion or cold detach-
ment, but rather with respect and in a fair manner (i.e., less as distant reg-
ulatees and more as clients or business partners; Alford and Speed [2006],
Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl [2008]).
Second, the authority can use this strategy to explain why it needs exten-
sive or detailed information. This is particularly important, as providing ex-
planations about legal requirements and advice on how to implement them
helps firms to “make sense” of what is requested from them and encourages
compliance (Fairman and Yapp [2005], Mendoza, Dekker, and Wielhouwer
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[2016]). For example, the authority can indicate that the information will
be used to gain a better understanding of firms’ states and needs, and con-
sequently design and implement tools and strategies that better align firms’
interests with the interests of the authority and the industry as a whole. No-
tably, an effective shift from external to internal monitoring requires con-
vincing explanations of why reliable internal diagnostics are useful for both
the authority and the firm (e.g., for tracking and improving performance
over time; Sinclair [1997]).
A third reason, which follows from the prior two, is that a supportive
strategy enhances perceptions of informational fairness (provision of in-
formation in a sufficient, clear, and timely manner), procedural fairness
(incorporation of firms’ perspectives and needs on how to respond to of-
ficial requests), and interpersonal fairness (treatment of firms with dignity
and respect through, for example, a supportive tone; for a review of fairness
dimensions, see Colquitt et al. [2001]). These perceptions enhance the le-
gitimacy of the authority’s requests, and increase the willingness to submit
and obey on a voluntary basis (Tyler [2006]). Indeed, these perceptions of
fairness can lead to reciprocating behaviors of supervised firms (Smith and
Stalans [1991], Smith [1992]).
These elements suggest that a supportive regulatory strategy can be used
to explicitly recognize and further promote both economic and norma-
tive motivations. Firms are better able to identify the material benefits of
high reporting quality when they are provided with straightforward expla-
nations of why it is needed and justified (which relates to the outcome of
the request). In addition, a supportive regulatory strategy signals that the
authority strives for responsiveness, simplicity, and accessibility, and that it
cares about the firm and the relationship they share (which relates to the
process of how the request is made and handled; Alford and Speed [2006]).
By implication, a supportive regulatory strategy involves the respectful and
empathic treatment of firms. All these elements have the potential to en-
hance fairness perceptions and normative motivations to improve report-
ing quality and to draw attention to its economic value. In terms of social
exchange, a strategy based on support, guidance, and service delivery can
be seen as a “gift” from the authority, and may trigger reciprocation from
at least a fraction of firms (Alford and Speed [2006]).
2.4 OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS THAT REFLECT A SUPPORTIVE
REGULATORY STRATEGY
Official communications are at the core of a supportive regulatory strat-
egy, especially in the context of self-reporting. They are indicative of the
social distance between the authority and the firm (Braithwaite [2003]),
and of how the firm is perceived and treated by the authority (e.g., as a
suspect vs. a client or business partner; with empathy and respect vs. suspi-
cion and detachment). Furthermore, official communications are a princi-
pal mechanism through which a service delivery approach is materialized
on an industry-wide scale, as these communications are needed to properly
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(1) explain how to obtain materials, tools, and information that firms may
require to successfully respond to the authority’s request (accessibility), (2)
describe and justify the purpose of the request (goal alignment), and (3)
display a respectful and open attitude toward the firm (tone). For these
reasons, official communications are inherently linked to how firms in gen-
eral develop perceptions about the regulatory strategy—not only in terms
content, but also in terms of form, style and tone.
This logic applies to the specific case of official communications in which
the authority explicitly requests high reporting quality, which is the main
focus or our analysis. Hence, we state our first hypothesis as follows:
H1: The extent to which official communication reflects a supportive
regulatory strategy is positively associated with reporting quality.
2.5 THE MODERATING EFFECTS OF FIRM SIZE AND FIRMS’ TIME HORIZON
H1 predicts average differences in reporting quality between firms that
receive communications of a different nature. However, there are also ar-
guments against this expectation. In a firm-level—instead of an individual-
level—setting, the content of the communication can be ignored or insuf-
ficiently noticed by firms, and may therefore have little or no impact on
behavior. In addition, regulations in the setting of our experiment (finan-
cial intermediation) have expanded and tightened in recent years, so let-
ters reflecting less intrusiveness and more support could be perceived as
“soft,” diluting the authority’s mandate to legally require firms to comply
with its requests. One limitation of communicating a supportive regula-
tory strategy is that it can induce opportunistic behavior, as it relies less
on deterrence (Alford and Speed [2006]). Taking these counterarguments
into consideration, we identify two relevant factors that can moderate
the expected association between reporting quality and the nature of the
communication.
2.5.1. Firm Size. Firm size is indicative of the availability of resources
and organizational specialization and professionalism. Reporting and
compliance-related tasks are typically performed by owners or high-level
managers in smaller firms, and by specialized departments or personnel
in larger firms. As firms become larger, reporting tasks are more likely sys-
tematic and standardized, and interactions with the authority may be more
frequent (due to relative importance in the market). For these reasons,
larger firms might be less sensitive to the content of standardized official
communications.
One could also argue that compliance officers in larger firms may have
relatively more resources available for gathering and reporting informa-
tion, and that noting a supportive regulatory strategy could make them
walk the extra mile. However, these officers are likely evaluated based on
how they avoid issues with—and raise no concerns from—the authorities.
Hence, we expect larger firms to have relatively higher reporting quality,
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FIG. 1.—The moderating effects of firm size and time horizon.
independent of the level of support they perceive. Our second hypothesis
is depicted in figure 1, and is stated as follows:
H2: Firm size weakens the positive effect of communicating a support-
ive regulatory strategy on reporting quality.
The predicted moderation effect of firm size is relevant in practice, as it
informs regulators about the possible benefits of customizing their commu-
nications for small firms and individuals as compared to larger firms.
2.5.2. Time Horizon. This refers to the extent to which firms value future
payoffs. It plays a crucial role in intertemporal decisions, in which costs
and benefits are spread out over several periods of time (Loewenstein and
Thaler [1989]). Reporting information can be analyzed as an intertempo-
ral decision-making process. High reporting quality is costly, as it demands
time and effort, and thus can be seen as a cost in the short run, but as
an investment in the long run. This is because high reporting quality can
reduce future (expected) costs associated with potential audits and inspec-
tions, penalties, and legal disputes, and can also reduce time and expedite
the process of gathering, storing, and retrieving information in the future.
This is consistent with the idea that long-term oriented agents value cost-
reductions derived from lower supervision, and can thus be monitored to a
lesser extent (Mendoza and Wielhouwer [2015]).
Short-term oriented firms are expected to act in a more opportunis-
tic manner, focusing predominantly on minimizing costs. They may even
blame the authority for the circumstances they are in, and perceive regula-
tion as mainly costly and obstructive. This can trigger uncooperative motiva-
tional postures toward the authority and its requests (Braithwaite [2003]).
But more importantly, short-term oriented firms may interpret a supportive
tone as part of a weak enforcement strategy, which is relatively less focused
on deterrence and therefore less likely to be effective in detecting and
punishing deviance or non-compliance. These firms may see a supportive
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regulatory strategy as an opportunity to reduce costs, and assign less value
to the potential benefits of attaining high reporting quality and developing
a cooperative long-term relationship with the authority. Our third hypoth-
esis is depicted in figure 1, and is stated as follows:
H3: The positive effect of communicating a supportive regulatory strat-
egy on reporting quality is enhanced by long-term orientation and
reversed by (becomes negative with) short-term orientation.
3. Data
3.1 RESEARCH SETTING: FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
To test our hypotheses, we conduct a field experiment in the regulatory
setting of financial intermediation in the Netherlands. In general, finan-
cial intermediation regulations aim to encourage financial intermediaries
to provide sound and transparent advice to potential customers of finan-
cial products, such as life insurances or mortgage loans. Because financial
intermediaries tend to have more knowledge than customers about finan-
cial matters, and charge commissions or fees for the products they sell, they
have incentives to provide inaccurate or unsuitable advice to customers in
order to increase private gains (a practice referred to as misselling; Inderst
and Ottaviani [2009]). Hence, the core objective of regulations in this set-
ting is to prevent misselling behavior.
To conduct the field experiment, we entered into a research collabora-
tion agreement with the Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM), which is
the supervisor of the financial markets in the Netherlands (AFM [2017]).
The AFM supervises approximately 7,000 financial intermediaries, who sell
or provide advice on financial products such as mortgage loans, income
insurances, and damage insurances.
3.2 MARKET MONITOR
As part of its supervision strategy, the AFM employs a mandatory, online
self-assessment instrument called Market Monitor (MM), which gathers de-
tailed information from all financial intermediaries on a yearly basis. This
information relates to licenses and registrations, economic activities, finan-
cial products the firm specializes in, number and types of customers, num-
ber and function of employees, sales per product, and other specifics re-
lated to accounting and financial matters (appendix A contains translated
questions from the 2017 MM). The MM provides the AFM with a compre-
hensive overview of the accounting, financial, and managerial states of in-
dividual firms as well as the industry as a whole. At the same time, the MM
helps firms to become aware of internal processes and performance, and
to track their progress with regard to recommended practices.
The MM is a central element of the AFM’s regulatory strategy. Although
the AFM also receives customer complaints and performs random audits,
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completing and submitting the MM is the only or main way in which most
firms interact with the AFM (unless they contact the AFM for other pur-
poses or specific questions). Because of the size of the market, the AFM
needs to rely heavily on signals and risk-based supervision to effectively reg-
ulate financial intermediaries. Notably, the MM is the only means through
which the AFM can gather detailed information on all market participants
simultaneously and on a yearly basis. The key implication is that, for most
firms, interactions with the AFM are restricted to communications directly
related to the MM, and in this sense, the AFM’s official communications are
at the basis upon which financial intermediaries form perceptions about
the AFM’s regulatory strategy.
Before conducting the experiment, the AFM granted us access to the
responses from the 2016 MM, which allowed us to become familiar with
the data (e.g., structure, coding), design the random stratification proce-
dure, and explore the feasibility and measurement properties of our depen-
dent, moderator, and control variables. After conducting the experiment,
we were granted access to the responses from the 2017 MM. Anonymous
firm identifiers allow us to track firm responses between these years. Our
analysis is based entirely on anonymized MM responses.
The instructions to complete and submit the MM were sent out in three
batches. The number of firms included in the first, second, and third
batches of 2017 are 200, 3,544, and 3,498, respectively (these numbers dif-
fer based on the AFM’s estimates about the time required by firms to com-
plete the MM). The instruction letter was sent to all firms on January 26,
2017. Subsequently, firms received a (second) letter with their username,
and one day later, they received a (third) letter with the password to log
into the system. The first batch received these letters on January 31 and
February 1, the second batch on February 7 and 8, and the third batch
on February 21 and 22. Firms in the first batch were requested to submit
the completed MM between February 6 and March 12, firms in the second
batch between February 13 and March 19, and firms in the last batch be-
tween February 27 and April 2. Upon receiving the first (instruction) letter,
firms can—and are advised by the AFM to—prepare all the information re-
quested. One week before the deadline, firms that had not completed the
MM received a reminder letter. After the deadline, firms that still had not
completed the MM received an additional reminder letter. A final reminder
letter was sent to a small number of non-responding firms as a last oppor-
tunity to complete the MM before the AFM would take regulatory actions
against the firm. Online appendix A contains translated first and second
reminder letters.
The vast majority of firms was already familiar with the MM, and the
mandatory requirement to complete it. Over 98% of firms in our sample
had completed the MM in 2016. Familiarity with the instrument is relevant
for the experiment, as inexperience could confound our results (e.g., new
firms receiving a letter that reflect a supportive regulatory strategy could
mistakenly assume that the MM is non-mandatory).
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3.3 EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION
We were granted permission to manipulate the content of the three let-
ters that the AFM uses to communicate the instructions, username, and
password required to complete and submit the MM. Our objective is to in-
troduce a manipulation that is consistent throughout these three letters,
and assess its effect on reporting quality. Firms are randomly stratified to
one of the following three experimental manipulations:
1. Letters that do not reflect a supportive regulatory strategy (referred
to as low support letters).
2. Letters that reflect a supportive regulatory strategy, and thus signal a
cooperative attitude toward the firm (high support letters).
3. Letters that are similar to the letter the authority sent out in the prior
year (which the AFM requested to include). The responses of this
group of firms will not be part of our analyses.
We identify three elements that a supportive regulatory strategy has,
and that can be signaled via official communications. These are referred
to as tone (Wenzel [2006]), purpose (Greenberg [1994], Alford and Speed
[2006]), and accessibility (Alford and Speed [2006]). As explained next,
these elements are expected to affect firms’ perceptions about support in
the same direction.
3.3.1. Tone. High support letters use a supportive tone, while low sup-
port letters use a more distant, formal and authoritative tone. Wenzel
[2006] showed that an authority’s tone can influence agents’ perceptions
of interpersonal fairness (which relates to whether firms feel that they are
treated with fairness and respect). As opposed to low support letters, high
support letters are expected to enhance firms’ perceptions of interpersonal
fairness, and motivations to reciprocate the authority’s cooperative attitude
and comply with its requests (Smith and Stalans [1991], Smith [1992]).
Hence, support in this context is expected to have a positive impact on
reporting quality.
3.3.2. Purpose. In the high support letters, the authority provides infor-
mation about the goals of the MM, describes how these goals are aligned
with the goals of the firm, and explains why it needs high-quality informa-
tion from the firm. In the low support letters, the authority neither pro-
vides information about the goals of the MM nor provides explicit reasons
why high-quality information is valuable. These explanations are crucial, as
they educate firms and allow them to “make sense” of what the AFM is re-
questing from them, and can therefore increase firms’ cooperativeness and
willingness to comply. Communicating the purpose of the MM may mo-
tivate firms to reciprocate the authority’s open attitude, voluntarily share
information, and engage in an open dialogue (Smith and Stalans [1991],
Smith [1992]). Providing information about purpose can also enhance
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perceptions of procedural fairness, which relate to how firms perceive that
their perspective is being taken into account (Greenberg [1994]).
3.3.3. Accessibility. Accessibility is one of the key elements that can en-
hance firms’ positive experiences with the authority (Alford and Speed
[2006]). We manipulate accessibility by altering the extent to which the
AFM signals willingness to help firms complete the MM, but not the op-
tions that firms have to contact and receive help from the AFM. The tone
and formulations of the low support letters signal that there is low willing-
ness to help firms to complete the MM, while in the high support letters,
the AFM signals a great willingness to help. We expect a signal of high (low)
willingness to negatively (positively) influence firms’ perceived barrier to
contact the authority. A perceived low barrier to contact the authority may
open a dialogue with the authority, and increase information sharing. Ac-
cessibility can also positively influence perceptions of informational and
interpersonal fairness. Agents may feel they are treated with respect and
provided with all information to contact the authority to successfully re-
spond to the authority’s request, which through reciprocating behavior, is
motivating them to increase reporting quality (Smith and Stalans [1991]).
Appendix B contains the translated version of the letters. We conducted
two pretests in different populations to assess the strength of the proposed
manipulations in the instruction letter.2 First, we followed a similar ap-
proach to that used in Wenzel [2006] by directly assessing group differ-
ences in perceptions based on different instruction letters that experimen-
tal participants receive. Specifically, we provided participants with similar
invitation letters to those used in the field experiment, but then related to
a fictional setting of tax reporting. We solicited participation of 106 bach-
elor students in an accounting course at a Dutch university to whom we
randomly assigned the letters. After reading the letter, students filled out a
set of questions about perceptions related to motivational postures toward
the authority, informational and interpersonal fairness, and the authority’s
regulatory strategy. Results show that the high support letter was perceived
as being more informationally fair, and more directed toward support than
the low support letter. However, absolute differences between conditions
were relatively small. Participants’ motivational postures toward the author-
ity were not altered by the treatment. We discussed these results with the
AFM and decided to strengthen the manipulation by increasing the differ-
ences between the high and low support letters (e.g., different tone and
further adjusting information about goals and support).
The adjusted letters were pretested among 165 masters students in ac-
counting most of whom are studying part-time and are employed in a
reporting function. This test is based on a corporate tax reporting set-
ting. Half of the students indicated that they had experience in filing
corporate tax returns and thus had existing perceptions about the tax
2 Details on the results of the pretests are available in online appendix B.
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authority, which may be important to estimate the strength of the manip-
ulation (Choo, Fonseca, and Myles [2016]). Participants were randomly
assigned to one of the three instruction letters: high support, low sup-
port, or last year’s letter (which we included to consult the AFM about
its existing letter). After reading the letter, participants undertook a tax
reporting task, and then answered a set of questions capturing moti-
vational postures toward the authority, and perceptions of fairness, the
authority, and its regulatory strategy. This allowed us to assess percep-
tions in response to the letter, and to have participants conduct an ac-
tual task (i.e., distraction) before gathering their perceptions. The results
of this second pretest showed that the high support letter was perceived
to be more informationally and interpersonally fair, and aimed at support,
particularly by those students with corporate tax reporting experience. This
finding may well be explained by the fact that these students have a refer-
ence framework with which they evaluate the authority’s regulatory strategy.
This finding also suggests that changes in communication may be effective
when there were earlier interactions, which is applicable to most firms in
our sample.
3.4 DEPENDENT AND MODERATING VARIABLES
Across different regulatory settings, firms are expected to report informa-
tion in a precise and complete manner (Peeters [2006], Ernst and Young
[2012]), and these aspects can be directly associated with reporting quality.
Following this conceptualization, and based on the 2016 MM data (cover-
ing information from 2015) as well as on-site discussions with AFM repre-
sentatives, we identified the following three elements of reporting quality:
comprehensiveness, precision, and voluntary reporting.
Comprehensiveness of reporting refers to how completely firms report infor-
mation to the authority. The online MM does not allow firms to skip ques-
tions (i.e., forced answering). However, intermediaries can still avoid ques-
tions by deliberately choosing responses that limit the number of follow-up
questions (e.g., questions that apply to specific firm characteristics, prod-
ucts, and activities).3 Our measure of comprehensiveness captures the total
number of questions responded to by firms. Although this does not allow
us to observe whether individual firms deliberately avoided follow-up ques-
tions (e.g., by choosing options that avoid follow up questions), it does tell
us whether the average number of completed questions varies between ex-
perimental conditions. Group differences would be indicative of avoiding
behavior, and thus reflect differences in comprehensiveness.
Precision of reporting refers to the precision of numerical responses, such
as sales and number of customers. For most of these questions, the AFM
3 For example, firms indicating that they have part-time employees are asked to respond to
follow-up questions about those employees. The same applies to specific financial products,
such as mortgage loans or life insurance policies.
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Experimental treatment: high support letters (1) versus low
support letters (0; see appendix B for translated letters).
Reporting quality Sum of standardized measures for comprehensiveness of
reporting, precision of reporting, and voluntary reporting.
Comprehensiveness of
reporting
The number of questions responded to.
Precision of reporting Precision of numerical information (average of scores on
items 2.11, 4.11, 5.1, 5.2, 5.5, 5.10, 5.11, 6.1, and 6.2)
measured as 1 minus the number of zero digits at the end
of a number divided by the total number of digits in the
number.
Voluntary reporting Indicator whether (1) or not (0) voluntary narrative
information is provided to item 1.18.
Firm size Natural logarithm of the number of full-time employees
(item 3.2).
Time horizon Average of the expected change (increase = 3, no change =
2, decrease = 1) in the number of employees (item 3.5),
and in firm sales (item 5.18).
Number of product types Sum of the types of products provided (item 1.4).
Type of products Three indicator variables: mortgage, damage insurance,
income insurance (item 1.4).




Membership of a branch organization yes/no (coded as 1
and 0, respectively; item 1.13).
Franchise Franchisee of a franchise organization yes/no (coded as 1
and 0, respectively; item 1.11)
Batch Indicator variable for the batch the firm was in (two dummy
variables: group 1 or 2).
Item numbers refer to questions in the 2017 MM (see appendix A). All data used for variable measure-
ment are derived from the MM.
explicitly allows intermediaries to provide estimates instead of exact num-
bers.
We use nine questions in the MM to construct a measure of precision
(among which are reported sales, provisions and commissions; see table 1).
We selected these questions because (1) they are relevant for the majority
of firms (most firms completed these questions in the 2016 MM), (2) the
reported information in these questions is proprietary and requires the in-
termediary to gather a larger amount of information to be able to provide
more precise estimates, and (3) the responses have multiple digits. Preci-
sion of reporting is measured as follows:
Precision = 1 − Number of zeros at the end of the reported number
Number of digits of the reported number
.
In order to compare precision across treatments, we compute the average
score per intermediary. For example, if the firm answered five of the nine
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questions, precision is equal to the average score across the five items. The
possible values for this variable range from just above 0 (only the first digit
is not equal to zero) to 1 (the firm did not report a zero at the end of the
number). Higher scores represent more precise reporting (i.e., fewer zeros
at the end of the number).
Voluntary reporting refers to whether firms respond to a non-mandatory
item included in the MM, which asks intermediaries to voluntarily provide
a description of the added value of their firm as compared to their com-
petitors. Respondents can choose whether to provide this information, and
if they do, they can use at maximum 250 words. Voluntary reporting is mea-
sured with a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the firm answered the
question, and 0 otherwise. In a robustness test, we use the number of words
provided as an alternative measure of voluntary reporting.
Overall reporting quality is a measure that combines the three different
components of reporting quality indicated above. These components are
expected to represent three different dimensions of reporting quality,
which aren’t necessarily consistent. For example, firms may decide to invest
time in submitting a comprehensive report, at the expense of precision or
voluntary reporting. Our pre-experimental analysis of the 2016 MM data
also supported the existence of individual dimensions of reporting quality.
The overall measure of reporting quality equals the sum of the standard-
ized three components. Higher scores reflect higher reporting quality.
Time horizon is measured using two questions in which firms indicate
whether they expect (1) number of employees and (2) sales to decrease,
be the same, or increase in the future. The intuition behind the measure is
that an expected decrease (increase) in employees and/or sales indicates
organizational decline (growth) and a shorter (longer) time horizon. If a
firm expects sales to grow, this indicates that future sales are relatively more
important compared to current sales, and that the net present value is rel-
atively more dependent on future sales. Similarly, if a firm expects to hire
new employees, it is likely to expect increasing business, which makes the
future relatively more valuable. Hiring new employees can also be seen as
an investment, which will only pay off in the future. We rate the responses
to each question from 1 to 3, where 1 indicates an expected decrease, 2
indicates expected stability, and 3 indicates an expected increase in sales or
number of employees. The correlation between the two questions is 0.301
in 2017 (p < 0.01). We use the average score of these two items as a proxy
for time horizon, so that lower values represent a short-term orientation,
whereas higher values represent a long-term orientation.
Firm size is captured by the number of full-time employees. The 2016 data
show a non-normal distribution, so we apply a log-transformation.
3.5 CONTROL VARIABLES
We control for (1) the number of different product types that intermedi-
aries sell as well as specific types of products, (2) prior experience with the
MM (as indicated by having completed the previous MM), (3) connections
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to branch organizations, (4) franchise connections, and (5) the batch in
which the letters were sent out.
Intermediaries can sell 13 different types of products for which they need
a license issued by the AFM. As a greater product range makes more ques-
tions in the MM applicable, we control for the number of product types that
intermediaries sell. The maximum value of this variable is 13. We also in-
clude dummy variables to control for whether firms sell any of the three
most frequently sold product types: damage insurance, mortgages, and income
insurance, as these may receive relatively more attention in the MM.4 We
further control for the potential effect of having prior experience with the
MM, as prior interactions with the AFM and this instrument can affect how
firms respond to the manipulation. Prior experience can make firms bet-
ter prepared to respond to an information request, and influence attitudes
toward the authority. On the other hand, our pretests signaled that expe-
rience can make the treatment effect stronger, as the firm has a reference
to compare the treatment to. We further control for whether the firm is
a member of one or more branch organizations, as interactions with these
connections may also affect intermediaries’ perceptions. Similarly, we con-
trol for whether the firm is part of a franchise, which may affect the firm’s
information environment and connections. Finally, we include two dummy
variables to control for the batch number the firm was part of, as the MM is
sent out in different batches.
Table 1 provides an overview of the constructs and their operationaliza-
tion.
3.6 RANDOM ASSIGNMENT
In order to test our hypotheses, we used a stratified random sampling
approach to assign the treatment to firms. Using the 2016 MM data, we
first derived the score for each firm on the time horizon measure. This
yields five different time horizon groups (the average score for items 3.5
and 5.18 can take any of the following values: 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, and 3). Within
these groups we ordered firms by size, and then randomly assigned the
treatments to the firms. In this way we assured that, within each time hori-
zon level, treatments are randomly assigned to intermediaries with different
sizes. Figure 2 depicts the random stratification procedure. In each of the
treatment conditions, there are approximately 2,400 intermediaries. To test
our hypotheses, we only focus on the high- and low-support group.
We also used the 2016 MM data to examine if the two stratification con-
ditions (firm size and time horizon), as well as existing perceptions about
the authorities’ information provision concerning the MM, are associated
with the treatment conditions. Associations between these variables and the
4 Other products for which intermediaries need an AFM license are: consumer credit, elec-
tronic money, capital products, health insurance policies, pension insurance policies, pre-
mium pension claims, participation rights in investment companies, investment objects, pay-
ment accounts, and savings accounts.
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FIG. 2.—Random stratification of intermediaries.
treatment could affect the results of the experiment. Existing perceptions
on the authorities’ information provision concerning the MM are captured
by the responses to two statements in the MM, being the extent to which re-
spondents believed that (1) they were timely informed about the MM, and
(2) it was clear to them which information they needed to collect to com-
plete it. We find no significant differences between the treatment groups
for firm size (t-statistics: –0.3958), time horizon (t-statistics: 0.0427), and
these perceptions (t-statistics: 0.6814 and 0.4403). This provides confidence
that our random stratification procedure was successful.
4. Research Design
Summary statistics are reported in table 2. The samples sizes for the 2016
and 2017 MM are 4,323 and 4,577, respectively. Reporting quality is the sum
of the standardized values of comprehensiveness of reporting, precision
of reporting, and voluntary reporting. In the 2017 MM (which refers to
data over 2016), firms on average responded to 54% of the 111 questions
included, reported with an average precision of 70%, and had a voluntary
reporting response of 41%.
Firms in the industry are relatively small, ranging in the majority of cases
between 0 and 10 full-time employees (note firm size statistics reported in
table 2 are log-transformed). Firms are relatively more long-term oriented
than short-term oriented, as time horizon on average lies above the mid-
point of the scale (2.2 > 2). Firms sell on average five types of products.
Damage insurance, income insurance, and mortgage loans are sold by 87%,
76%, and 64% of firms, respectively. Most firms have experience with the
MM, as in 2017 less than 2% completed it for the first time. In the industry,
60% of firms are connected to a branch organization, and 9% are part of a
franchise chain.
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T A B L E 2
Summary Statistics
Variable MM Year Mean SD Q1 Median Q3
Reporting quality 2017 0.000 1.740 –1.188 –0.052 1.157
2016 0.056 1.701 –1.191 0.012 1.251
Comprehensiveness of reporting 2017 59.674 7.767 55.000 60.000 65.000
2016 60.338 7.681 55.000 61.000 65.000
Precision of reporting 2017 0.692 0.142 0.590 0.682 0.790
2016 0.686 0.143 0.583 0.677 0.781
Voluntary reporting 2017 0.407 0.491 0.000 0.000 1.000
2016 0.413 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000
Firm size 2017 1.073 0.778 0.693 0.693 1.386
2016 1.072 0.785 0.693 0.693 1.386
Time horizon 2017 2.174 0.462 2.000 2.000 2.500
2016 2.183 0.473 2.000 2.000 2.500
Mortgage 2017 0.645 0.479 0.000 1.000 1.000
2016 0.636 0.481 0.000 1.000 1.000
Damage insurance 2017 0.869 0.338 1.000 1.000 1.000
2016 0.883 0.322 1.000 1.000 1.000
Income insurance 2017 0.758 0.429 1.000 1.000 1.000
2016 0.773 0.419 1.000 1.000 1.000
Number of products 2017 5.127 2.730 3.000 5.000 7.000
2016 5.451 2.615 3.000 5.000 7.000
Experience 2017 0.984 0.127 1.000 1.000 1.000
2016 0.986 0.118 1.000 1.000 1.000
Branch organization 2017 0.605 0.489 0.000 1.000 1.000
2016 0.603 0.489 0.000 1.000 1.000
Franchise 2017 0.095 0.293 0.000 0.000 0.000
2016 0.089 0.285 0.000 0.000 0.000
2017 MM procedure
Batch 1 0.030 0.171 0.000 0.000 0.000
Batch 2 0.488 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000
Batch 3 0.482 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000
Reminder letter 1 0.642 0.479 0.000 1.000 1.000
Reminder letter 2 0.081 0.272 0.000 0.000 0.000
Last reminder letter 0.005 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.000
For MM 2016, N = 4,323, and for MM 2017, N = 4,577. The first reminder letter was sent out to firms
that had not completed the MM one week before the deadline, the second and final reminder letters were
sent after the deadline. Online appendix A contains translated first and second reminder letters. Variable
definitions are provided in table 1. In the proposal, we indicated our intention of reporting maximum and
minimum values in table 2. However, because of confidentiality reasons, we have been asked to report Q1,
median, and Q3 instead.
The AFM sent out instruction letters in three batches. The first batch
contained approximately 3% of the sample. The second and third batches
are similar in size (49% and 48%, respectively). A first reminder letter was
sent out to 64% of firms before the deadline, and a second reminder letter
to 8% of firms after the deadline. A “last reminder letter” was sent out to
0.5% of firms, with a final request to complete the MM before taking reg-
ulatory actions. The experimental treatment is not significantly correlated
with being part of these batches or receiving any of the reminder letters (as
these are dummy variables, we estimate tetrachoric correlation coefficients,
and in all cases p > 0.10).
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T A B L E 3
Pearson Correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 High support letter 1.000
2 Reporting quality –0.022 1.000
3 Comprehensiveness –0.007 0.578∗∗∗ 1.00
4 Precision –0.017 0.598∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 1.000
5 Voluntary reporting –0.014 0.565∗∗∗ –0.027∗ 0.009 1.000
6 Firm size 0.002 0.304∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.005 1.000
7 Time horizon –0.012 0.198∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.029∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗
This table slightly deviates from the proposal as the “High support letter” variable was not included.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tailed), respectively.
Table 3 contains Pearson correlations between the main variables of in-
terest. Receiving a high support letter is negatively though not significantly
correlated with reporting quality (r = –0.02; p = 0.14) nor with any of its
components. Reporting quality is, however, positively correlated with firm
size (r = 0.30; p < 0.01) and time horizon (r = 0.20; p < 0.01). This indi-
cates that firm characteristics influence reporting quality. Relatively larger
firms report in a more comprehensive (r = 0.48; p < 0.01) and precise
(r = 0.05; p < 0.01) manner, but do not differ from smaller firms in terms
of voluntary reporting (r = 0.01; p > 0.10). For long-term oriented firms,
reporting is more comprehensive, precise, and voluntary (in these three
cases, p < 0.01). Moreover, the positive association between firm size and
time horizon (r = 0.20; p < 0.01) indicates that larger firms tend to be more
long-term oriented.
4.1 STATISTICAL TESTING
H1 focuses on the main effect of the high support letter on reporting
quality, whereas H2 and H3 focus on how this effect is moderated by firm
size and time horizon. For each hypothesis, we employ not only reporting
quality as predicted variable, but also each of its three components. To test
H1, we assess group differences (between treatments) using t-tests and chi-
square tests, as well as OLS and logit regressions in which we control for the
potential influence of relevant variables. The baseline model is specified as
follows:
Reporting quality = α + β1 · high support letter + β2 · time horizon
+β3 · firm size + i=4..12βi · control variablei + ε. (1)
Our expectation is that β1 is positive and significant.
H2 and H3 are tested simultaneously, using an extended version of the
baseline model that incorporates interaction terms. To test H2, we in-
clude the interaction between firm size and the treatment variable, which
we expect to be negative and significant. H3 predicts that the effect of the
high support letter on reporting quality is (1) positive when time horizon
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is high (i.e., when firms are long-term oriented), and (2) negative when
time horizon is low (i.e., when firms are short-term oriented). H3 is tested
in two ways. First, we replace the time horizon variable with two dummies:
one for short-term oriented firms (taking the value 1 if the time horizon
score lies below the midpoint of the scale, and 0 otherwise), and another
dummy for long-term oriented firms (taking the value 1 if the score lies
above the midpoint of the scale, and 0 otherwise). The regression model
includes both dummies and their corresponding interactions with the treat-
ment variable. In this way, we can assess the expected positive and negative
interaction effects (for long-term and short-term oriented firms, respec-
tively) in the same regression. Under this model specification, the regres-
sion intercept captures the time horizon scores that lie at the midpoint of
the scale (i.e., medium-term oriented firms are treated as the reference
category).
Second, we test H3 by generating a categorical time-horizon variable that
has three levels—for short, medium, and long-term oriented firms (tak-
ing the values 1, 2, and 3 if the score is less than, equal to, and greater
than the midpoint of the time horizon scale). We run a regression in
which we incorporate the interaction between the treatment and this cat-
egorical variable, and use this interaction to estimate and compare the
marginal effects of the three time horizon categories across the two ex-
perimental conditions.5 As we expect an antagonizing interaction effect
(which is negative for the first level, and positive for the third level), we
do not formulate an empirical expectation about the sign or the signifi-
cance of the interaction term. For both regressions (one using two time
horizon dummies, and another using one categorical time horizon vari-
able), we assess whether the effect of the high support letter is larger for
long-term oriented firms, and smaller for short-term oriented firms, as com-




To assess the treatment effect as predicted in H1, we first estimate mean
and frequency differences between experimental conditions as registered
in the proposal. Consistent with the correlation coefficients presented in
table 3, the reported t- and chi-square tests in tables 4 and 5 indicate that
there are no differences between experimental conditions in reporting
quality or any of its components.
We also assess the significance of the treatment effect by conducting a
planned regression analysis in which we control for relevant covariates. We
5 In the planned additional tests, we also run this analysis refining the time horizon measure
to all five possible values, which was conditional on obtaining enough observations per level.
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T A B L E 4
Mean Differences and t-Tests for Reporting Quality and Two of Its Components (Planned Tests)
High Support Low Support Difference
Reporting quality –0.038 0.038 0.076 (0.140)
Comprehensiveness of reporting 59.619 59.730 0.111 (0.629)
Precision of reporting 0.690 0.695 0.005 (0.243)
p-values are in parentheses.
T A B L E 5
Contingency Table for Frequencies of Voluntary Reporting (Planned Test)
High Support Low Support Total
Voluntary reporting = 1 917 946 1,863
Voluntary reporting = 0 1,374 1,341 2,715
Total 2,291 2,287 4,578
Chi-square 0.849 (0.357)
p-value is in parentheses.
employ linear regressions for reporting quality, comprehensiveness, and
precision of reporting, and a logit regression for voluntary reporting. The
results are presented in table 6, and indicate that the treatment has no main
effect on the predicted variables.
We run four regressions simultaneously, which can affect the likelihood
of finding significant results in one or more of them. As planned, we follow
theorem 3.1 of List, Shaikh, and Xu [2016] to correct the p-values of the
independent variable for family-wise error rates (e.g., inflated alphas), and
obtain the same pattern of results (untabulated; corrected p-values of the
treatment effect are 0.476 for comprehensiveness, 0.454 for precision, and
0.576 for voluntary reporting).
Table 6 also indicates that reporting quality is negatively associated with
having experience with the MM, and positively associated with firm size,
time horizon, being connected to a branch organization, selling of mort-
gage loans or income insurance, and the number of products sold. The
negative effect of experience indicates that reporting quality is higher for
the small fraction of new firms that completed the MM for the first time
in 2017. New firms may have particularly strong motivations to act respon-
sibly and comply with the authority’s requests. The effects of firm size and
number of products sold can be expected, as they relate primarily to com-
prehensiveness of reporting, and may in part derive from the fact that these
firms have more information to report. The positive effect of connections
to branch organizations is consistent with the idea that firm behavior is in-
fluenced not only by the authority, but also by peers and industry actors.
Time horizon relates positively and significantly to both comprehensive-
ness of reporting and voluntary reporting. The effects of the other control
variables on the subcomponents of reporting quality are ambiguous, as the
coefficients vary in signs and significance.
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Intercept –1.520∗∗∗ 42.460∗∗∗ 0.770∗∗∗ –0.108
(0.231) (0.734) (0.021) (0.301)
High support + –0.061 –0.054 –0.004 –0.048
(0.046) (0.147) (0.004) (0.061)
Firm size 0.326∗∗∗ 2.628∗∗∗ –0.003 0.019
(0.040) (0.129) (0.004) (0.053)
Time horizon 0.398∗∗∗ 1.867∗∗∗ 0.003 0.275∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.165) (0.005) (0.069)
Mortgage credit 0.190∗∗∗ 3.238∗∗∗ –0.010∗ –0.313∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.201) (0.006) (0.083)
Income insurance 0.363∗∗∗ 2.961∗∗∗ 0.005 –0.111
(0.070) (0.223) (0.006) (0.092)
Damage insurance –0.102 1.151∗∗∗ –0.014∗∗ –0.309∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.240) (0.007) (0.098)
Number of products 0.104∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗ 0.002 –0.000
(0.014) (0.044) (0.001) (0.018)
Experience –0.427∗∗ 2.720∗∗∗ –0.087∗∗∗ –0.326
(0.186) (0.592) (0.017) (0.241)
Branch organization 0.414∗∗∗ 2.140∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.080
(0.054) (0.172) (0.005) (0.071)
Franchise –0.030 1.254∗∗∗ –0.014∗ –0.195∗
(0.082) (0.260) (0.007) (0.110)
Batch 1 0.705∗∗∗ 1.181∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.051
(0.174) (0.553) (0.016) (0.227)
Batch 2 –0.010 0.121 –0.003 –0.003
(0.048) (0.153) (0.004) (0.063)
N 4,577 4,577 4,577 4,577
F/chi-square 95.34∗∗∗ 554.72∗∗∗ 7.29∗∗∗ 70.12∗∗∗
Adjusted-R2 0.198 0.592 0.016 0.011
Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels
(two-tailed), respectively.
5.2 HYPOTHESES 2 AND 3
In order to test whether the effect of the high support letter on report-
ing quality is weakened by firm size (H2), and strengthened and reversed
by long and short-term orientation, respectively (H3), we incorporate inter-
action terms in the regression model presented in table 6. Table 7 presents
the results of these planned tests. The control variables are included in all
regressions but not reported, as they follow the same pattern of results as
in table 6.
The results do not support H2. None of the four dependent variables
are associated with the interaction between high support and firm size (all
p-values > 0.10). Reporting quality increases as firms become larger, inde-
pendent of the level of support in the letters that they receive (β = 0.360;
p < 0.01), and this effect is primarily driven by increases in comprehensive-
ness (β = 2.772, p < 0.01).
THE TONE FROM ABOVE 491
T A B L E 7









Intercept –0.804∗∗∗ 45.824∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 0.387
(0.198) (–0.633) (0.018) (0.258)
High support (HS) –0.151∗∗ –0.067 –0.009 –0.168∗
(0.072) (0.230) (0.007) (0.096)
Firm size (FS) 0.360∗∗∗ 2.772∗∗∗ –0.005 0.078
(0.050) (0.158) (0.004) (0.065)
Short-term orientation
(STO)
–0.116 –0.527∗ 0.000 –0.093
(0.097) (0.310) (0.009) (0.129)
Long-term orientation
(LTO)
0.279∗∗∗ 1.508∗∗∗ 0.000 0.179∗
(0.072) (0.231) (0.007) (0.095)
HS × FS − –0.050 –0.171 0.004 –0.108
(0.060) (0.191) (0.005) (0.079)
HS × STO − 0.058 0.087 –0.005 0.180
(0.136) (0.435) (0.012) (0.181)
HS × LTO + 0.201∗∗ 0.045 0.013 0.219
(0.101) (0.323) (0.009) (0.134)
N 4,577 4,577 4,577 4,577
F/chi-square 72.83∗∗∗ 415.11∗∗∗ 5.85∗∗∗ 79.53∗∗∗
Adjusted-R2 0.201 0.591 0.017 0.013
The control variables are the same as in table 6, but are not reported in this table for brevity. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tailed),
respectively. The exact p-values of HS × LTH on comprehensiveness, precision, and voluntary reporting are
0.889, 0.160, and 0.101.
The main effects also show that long-term oriented firms report higher
quality data to the AFM (β = 0.279; p < 0.01) than short- and medium-term
oriented firms. However, short-term oriented firms do not deliver signifi-
cantly lower quality data than medium-term oriented firms (β = –0.116;
p > 0.10). The interactions with the time horizon indicators provide par-
tial support for H3. Short-term orientation does not significantly moderate
the effect of the high support letter on reporting quality, but long-term ori-
entation does (β = 0.201, p < 0.05). This overall effect is not due to the
individual components of reporting quality, but relates to the combination
of components. Although not significant, the sign of the interaction term
between high support and long-term orientation is positive across the three
reporting quality components. The significant interaction effect needs to
be analyzed in concert with the negative main effect of high support (β =
–0.151, p < 0.05). A plausible interpretation is that the high support let-
ter sends a signal of a soft or weak enforcement strategy, under which the
detection and punishment of non-compliance appear to be less of a prior-
ity for the authority. Considering that reporting quality is costly for firms
(in terms of, e.g., effort, time, specialized personnel), high support may
have the unintended effect of demotivating firms to attain high reporting
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Marginal Effects of High Support on Reporting Quality for Short- and Long-Term
Orientation (Planned Tests)
Short-Term Orientation (STO) Long-Term Orientation (LTO)
STO = 0 STO = 1 Difference LTO = 0 LTO = 1 Difference
High support = 0 0.141 –0.504 –0.645∗∗∗ –0.217 0.357 0.574∗∗∗
High support = 1 0.064 –0.581 –0.645∗∗∗ –0.336 0.379 0.715∗∗∗
Difference –0.077 –0.077 –0.118∗ 0.022
This table reports the results differently than how we proposed it. The current table is more functional
and provides more insight into the interaction between the treatment and time horizon.
STO = 1 (0) refers to the group of firms that have scores below (equal to or above) the midpoint of the
time horizon measure. Similarly, LTO = 1 (0) refers to the group of firms that have scores above (equal to
or below) the midpoint of the time horizon measure. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05,
and 0.10 levels (two-tailed), respectively.
quality. The negative effect of high support is, however, counteracted by a
long-term orientation. For long-term oriented firms, a high support letter
is less likely to negatively affect reporting quality. This is consistent with the
idea that long-term oriented firms see reporting quality as a continuous in-
vestment, which has longer term internal benefits (e.g., to track changes,
identify weaknesses through time), and external benefits for the relation-
ship with the authority (e.g., to build trust, fluent communication, and a
reliable mutual learning process). In this sense, a long-term orientation
may act as a buffer against possible changes in the perceived strength of
the authority’s enforcement strategy.
5.3 MARGINAL EFFECTS
The regression results presented in table 7 are used to estimate the
marginal effects of high support on reporting quality for short- and long-
term oriented firms. In line with our proposal, the differences between
marginal effects are reported in table 8. The estimations show that report-
ing quality significantly decreases with short-term orientation, and signifi-
cantly increases with long-term orientation. The key finding is that the high
support letter leads to lower reporting quality when firms are not long-term
oriented (i.e., for LTO = 0, high support reduces reporting quality by 0.118,
p = 0.052), while for long-term oriented firms reporting quality is similar
across the two letters. As explained earlier, long-term orientation may pre-
vent firms from taking advantage of what may be perceived as a softer or
weaker enforcement strategy.
5.4 UNEXPECTED EVENTS DURING THE STUDY AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE
RESULTS
As part of the two-stage editorial process, authors commit to the method-
ology and research design before the study is conducted and the data are
collected. Especially in the case of a field experiment, this process provides
scope for unexpected events to influence the data-gathering process (and
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possibly also results). We encountered three events that were beyond our
control but require attention.
First, due to an error in the letter printing process outsourced by the
AFM, around 30 firms received the invitation letter on printing paper of
another company (Heineken) instead of AFM paper. The AFM contacted
each of these firms as soon as they noticed the mistake. The error received
limited media attention, which likely has reached at least part of the firms in
the sample. If we exclude the firms that received the flawed letter from the
analysis, we find similar results, with the exception that the positive effect of
the interaction between the high support letter and long-term orientation
on voluntary reporting becomes marginally significant (p < 0.10).
Second, another printing error caused the second batch of firms to re-
ceive the username letter twice instead of first the username letter and
then the password letter. The AFM corrected this mistake by sending an
additional letter with the password. By controlling for batches in the main
analysis, we already take the potential effect of this error into account.
Third, the AFM sent three different reminder letters during the process:
the first a week before the deadline, the second after the deadline, and
then a third final reminder letter (see subsection 3.2 for a more thorough
explanation). Approximately 13% of intermediaries did not meet the dead-
line, which was a greater proportion than expected based on prior experi-
ence. The majority of these late respondents received multiple (generic)
reminder letters, which may have diluted the treatment effect, and these
firms may also have different motivations from those responding in time.
We conduct two tests to assess the potential impact of this proportion of
late responses. First, we use dummy variables to indicate if a firm received
a particular reminder letter and include them as additional covariates in
the main analysis. This yields the same pattern of results and strengthens
the association between reporting quality and the interaction between high
support and long-term orientation (p < 0.05). Second, we redo all main
analyses excluding late respondents. Results are similar to those reported
above, except for a marginally significant negative difference in average
reporting quality between experimental groups (p < 0.10).
5.5 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
5.5.1. Test A: Change in Reporting Quality. As proposed, we conduct an
additional analysis to examine whether the experimental treatment is as-
sociated with the change in reporting quality and its three components
(where change = 2017 score – 2016 score). For comprehensiveness, the
score is scaled using the total number of questions from the corresponding
year (i.e., change = 2017 score/111 items – 2016 score/109 items). The
results of the t and χ2 tests, as well as the regression analysis do not provide
evidence in favor of a treatment effect on any of these change variables.
When we include the interaction terms, however, we find a reasonably sim-
ilar pattern of results as in table 7. The main effect of high support is neg-
ative though no longer significant (p = 0.16), and the same holds for the
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positive interaction between high support and long-term orientation (p =
0.11). The main effect of firm size is positive for the change in reporting
quality (p < 0.01), comprehensiveness (p < 0.01), and voluntary reporting
(p < 0.05); and the main effect of long-term orientation is positive for the
change in reporting quality (p < 0.05) and comprehensiveness of report-
ing (p < 0.01). Consistent with H2, the effect of the interaction between
firm size and high support is negative for the change in voluntary report-
ing (p < 0.01). Consistent with H3, the effect of the interaction between
long-term orientation and high support is positive for the change in pre-
cision of reporting (p < 0.05). Online appendix C reports the tabulated
results.
5.5.2. Test B: Perceptions of Informational Fairness. We use the average score
of responses on the following two statements (item 8.1 in the MM) to create
a measure of informational fairness: “I was informed about the Market Mon-
itor in a timely manner,” and “It was sufficiently clear which information
my organization had to gather in order to provide answers to the ques-
tions in the Market Monitor” (Cronbach’s α = 0.90). These items are indica-
tive of perceived informational fairness as they relate to being informed
in a sufficient and timely manner. Responses were provided on a 5-point
scale, ranging from “completely disagree” to “completely agree.” The re-
sults of the planned additional t-tests indicate that informational fairness
does not differ across experimental conditions. These results are not con-
sistent with those of the pretests, namely that the treatment significantly in-
fluenced perceptions of informational fairness, especially for participants
with reporting experience. Furthermore, correlations between perceptions
of informational fairness and the measures of reporting quality are close
to zero and non-significant. OLS and logit regressions confirm that per-
ceptions of informational fairness are not significantly related to reporting
quality.
5.5.3. Test C: Benford’s Law. Benford’s law describes the phenomenon
that the first four digits of randomly reported numbers follow specific fre-
quency distributions (Benford [1938], Hill [1995]). Frequency distribu-
tions that deviate from Benford’s law may indicate that reported numbers
are fraudulent or imprecise (examples of applications of Benford’s law are
in Carslaw [1988], Nigrini [1996], Durtschi, Hilison, and Pacini [2004]).
For example, if reporters round numbers, this will cause increases in the
frequency of zeros relative to the base prediction of Benford’s law.
In a planned additional analysis, we use χ2 tests to estimate differences
in precision between experimental groups, by comparing their frequency
distributions of digits for reported sales (MM item 6.1) with Benford’s fre-
quency distribution. H1 predicts that the low support group will report with
lower precision than the high support group. Accordingly, we expect that
the low support group will show larger deviations from Benford’s distribu-
tion than the high support group, and that deviations occur at an earlier
digit (e.g., at the second instead of third digit). Figure 3 shows for the first
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FIG. 3.—Tests of deviations from Benford’s law (planned additional analysis).
Figure 3 shows for the first, second, third, and fourth digit of reported sales, how frequent
firms reported a particular number. Reported χ 2 (p-values) refer to the test statistic (signifi-
cance) of differences in frequency distributions between the treatment group and Benford’s
law.
four digits the frequency distributions for both the high and low support
group relative to Benford’s law.
In both experimental conditions, the first digit (panel A) does not sig-
nificantly deviate from Benford’s law, while the distribution of the second
digit (panel B) shows a more frequent observation of zeros and fives than
predicted, indicating that firms round numbers. For each of the treatment
conditions, the differences with Benford’s frequency distribution are highly
significant (p < 0.001). We find similar results for the frequency distri-
butions of the third and fourth digit (panels C and D); observed zeros
in both experimental conditions are much more frequent than Benford’s
frequency distributions would predict. These results are consistent with
common use of rounding by intermediaries at these digits, but reveal no
differences between the experimental groups. Indeed, tests of differences
between experimental groups in the frequencies of reported zeros and fives
show no significant differences for all four digits (all p-values > 0.05).
5.5.4. Test D: Timeliness in Responding. The AFM requires intermedi-
aries to report the requested information within a particular timeframe as
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Intercept –1.016∗∗∗ 1.219∗∗∗ 4.335∗∗∗ 3.179∗∗∗
(0.314) (0.071) (0.103) (0.029)
High support letter (HS) –0.101 0.037 –0.082∗∗ –0.055∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.026) (0.037) (0.013)
Firm size (FS) –0.019 0.065∗∗∗ 0.020 0.155∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.018) (0.026) (0.007)
Short time horizon (STH) 0.148 0.040 –0.022 0.047∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.035) (0.050) (0.017)
Long time horizon (LTH) –0.103 0.044∗ –0.062∗ 0.163∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.026) (0.037) (0.013)
HS × FS 0.001 –0.031 0.005 –0.006
(0.141) (0.022) (0.031) (0.008)
HS × STH 0.189 –0.077 0.058 –0.108∗∗∗
(0.256) (0.049) (0.071) (0.025)
HS × LTH 0.476∗∗ –0.055 0.071 0.191∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.036) (0.052) (0.017)
N 4,577 4,440 4,577 4,577
F/χ2 244.28∗∗∗ 6.84∗∗∗ 1.06 6,460.27∗∗∗
Adjusted-R2 0.069 0.021 0.000 0.036
Standard errors are included in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and
0.10 levels (two-tailed), respectively. We registered tests D, F, and G in our proposal.
effective supervision requires timely reporting of information. Therefore,
in this planned additional test, we examine how our treatment influences
timeliness in reporting, using a dummy variable that indicates whether in-
termediaries submitted responses in time (0) or not (1).6
In the high and low support conditions, 13.92% and 12.29% of the firms
submitted after the deadline, respectively. This difference is not significant
(p-value of chi-square test = 0.101). A planned logistic regression analysis
(table 9, column 1) further shows that the interaction effect between the
treatment and long-term orientation is positive and significant (β = 0.476,
p < 0.01). This indicates that long-term oriented firms receiving a high
support letter were less likely to meet the deadline. If long-term orientation
captures motivations to act responsibly, a low support letter (which makes
the deadline more salient) may move long-term oriented firms to report in
time.
5.5.5. Test E: Alternative Measure of Time Horizon. Our proposal (footnote
4) includes a planned test that was conditional on the time horizon variable
6 Initially, we expected that the high support letter could enhance intermediaries’ norma-
tive motivations to report early, but also that it could increase the time needed to report higher
quality data. Considering the main results, however, there is no reason to believe that the high
support group has better normative motivations than the low support group, nor that they
would invest extra to report higher quality data.
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FIG. 4.—Marginal effects of time horizon on reporting quality (95% CIs; planned additional
test).
having sufficient observations for the minimum (1) and maximum (3) val-
ues. As each time horizon category has sufficient observations, we conduct
the planned analysis and contrast the extremes with the levels in the mid-
dle (1.5, 2, and 2.5). The results are depicted in figure 4, and show that the
effect of the high support letter is negative for the shortest time horizon
(th = 1), leading to the lowest level of reporting quality (difference of
0.269, p = 0.036).
5.5.6. Test F: Effort in Responding. Higher quality reporting is expected
to be more time consuming. However, efficient preparation and well-
organized (and precise) information systems can decrease the time needed
to complete the MM. We examine in this planned additional test how our
treatment influences the self-reported time for preparing and completing
the MM (number of hours; item 8.5 in the MM), and the time firms actu-
ally spent online to complete the MM as recorded by the AFM. Due to the
skewed distributions of these variables, we log-transform them.7
On average, the high support group reported that they needed 3.87
(e1.352) hours to prepare and complete the MM, while the low support
group reported a time spending of 3.86 (e1.351) hours. AFM records show
that the high support group spent on average 1.59 hours online, and the
low support group on average 1.65 hours. These differences are not sig-
nificant. We conduct OLS regression analyses on both variables (table 9,
columns 2 and 3). The F-test of the regression model for recorded on-
line time is not significant, and we refrain from drawing inferences from
the results. Results for self-reported time confirm the results of the t-tests
7 We did not propose a logarithmic transformation. However, as we gathered the data, we
learned that there is a noise in the recorded online time (e.g., people leaving the screen
open without working on the MM). To decrease the impact of this noise and to normalize the
distribution, we apply a logarithmic transformation.
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that there is no difference between treatment conditions. Firm size (p <
0.01) and long-term orientation (p < 0.10) are positively associated with
self-reported time, which converges with the earlier finding that larger and
long-term oriented firms deliver higher reporting quality.
5.5.7. Test G: Extensiveness of Voluntary Reporting. We proposed as a poten-
tial alternative measure of voluntary reporting the number of words submit-
ted in item 1.18. This robustness test was conditional on obtaining access to
these data. We were able to obtain these data and replaced the voluntary re-
porting indicator with this measure of extensiveness of voluntary reporting
to redo all planned analyses. This provides similar results as reported, with
two exceptions. First, in line with the results of our main analyses, results
(table 9, column 4) show that firms with a low support letter on average
provided more words than firms with a high support letter (β = –0.055,
p < 0.01). Long-term oriented firms receiving a high support letter pro-
vide more extensive responses (β = 0.191, p < 0.01), while short-term ori-
ented firms receiving a high support letter provide the shortest (β = –0.108,
p < 0.01). The results of this planned additional test thus provide support
for the antagonizing interaction predicted in H3: the high support letter
induced more extensive voluntary reporting for long-term oriented firms,
while it did the opposite for short-term oriented firms.
Second, in analyses that employ the recalculated measure of reporting
quality (i.e., using the extensiveness of voluntary reporting), we similarly
find in the test that employs the 5-level categorical time horizon measure
(similar to test E) evidence for the predicted antagonizing interaction ef-
fect: high support increases reporting quality for long-term oriented firms
(p = 0.046), and reduces reporting quality for short-term oriented firms
(p = 0.016).
5.5.8. Test H: Perceived Inconsistency Between the High Support and Reminder
Letters. We conduct two unplanned additional tests because of the signif-
icant proportion of firms that received a first reminder letter one week
before the reporting deadline.8 The high support letter may have evoked a
weaker sense of obligation and urgency to report in time, which is in con-
trast to the tone of the reminder letter. Firms in the high support group
receiving a reminder letter may have perceived an inconsistency, which
could enhance perceptions of unfairness and translate into lower report-
ing quality. To examine the effects of this potential inconsistency on re-
porting quality and perceptions of informational fairness, we conduct two
unplanned additional tests. These tests use the same explanatory variables
as those reported in table 6, plus (1) a dummy variable taking the value 1 if
the firm received a reminder letter and 0 otherwise, and (2) its interaction
with the high support letter dummy. A negative and significant interaction
effect would indicate that firms receiving these two letters react negatively
8 We thank the reviewer for suggesting these additional tests.
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to potentially inconsistent messages. Untabulated results show this interac-
tion term is associated with neither overall reporting quality (β = –0.025,
p = 0.792) nor informational fairness (β = 0.052, p = 0.173), indicating no
significant differences induced by the reminder letter.
6. Conclusion
In collaboration with the Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) in the
Netherlands, we conduct a field experiment to examine whether official
communication that reflects a supportive regulatory strategy influences the
quality of the information reported in a mandatory self-assessment, which
is called Market Monitor (MM). Official communications (instructional let-
ters containing information about the invitation, username, and password
to complete and submit the MM) are manipulated in three ways. Letters
that reflect a high support strategy (high support letter) have a supportive
tone (tone), explain the objectives of the MM and how these align with the
objectives of the firm (purpose), and signal a strong willingness of the AFM
to help firms complete the MM (accessibility). In a low support letter, in con-
trast, the tone is distant, formal, and authoritative; firms are not informed
about the goals of the MM, and the communicated willingness to help firms
is low.
We hypothesize that (1) a high support letter is positively associated with
firms’ reporting quality, (2) firm size weakens this positive association, and
(3) a long-term orientation enhances this association, while a short-term
orientation reverses it (so that the effect becomes negative). In the planned
main analyses, we find no evidence indicating that the high support letter
induces higher reporting quality, or that this effect is moderated by firm
size, although firm size directly influences reporting quality. The planned
main and additional analyses provide partial evidence for the third hypoth-
esis. Firms with a long-term orientation have higher reporting quality than
firms with a medium or short-term orientation, and as compared to these
firms, show no decrease in reporting quality when receiving a high support
letter. If we replace the use of voluntary reporting for the extensiveness of
voluntary reporting, we find evidence for the predicted antagonistic effect,
where the high support letter has a positive (negative) effect for firms with
a long (short) time horizon. These results jointly suggest that, in order to
obtain high-quality information in self-reports, the authority benefits from
a high support letter only if firms have a long-term orientation.
In general, it is believed that authorities benefit from more support-based
regulatory strategies. We do not find support for that position in this indus-
try. A possible explanation is that, in the relationship between the AFM and
intermediaries, insufficient trust has been developed to accommodate such
a strategy. A survey of Baarsma, Risseeuw, and Rosenboom [2012] among
financial intermediaries found they were critical about the way in which
the AFM supervised the market (but not toward supervision in general).
Intermediaries also indicated in this survey they were not convinced that
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the information collected by the AFM was useful for supervision. While the
nature of self-reporting and the AFM’s information demands have changed
since then, intermediaries may still not be convinced of the objective of the
MM, may not feel the AFM is able to easily detect misreporting, and may
in general have negative motivational postures. If motivational postures are
on average already negative, a supportive strategy may not help to enhance
reporting quality. In contrast, compared to receiving a high support letter,
intermediaries receiving a low support letter may interpret the stricter tone
and low accessibility as an indication that reporting high-quality data is a
regulatory obligation. This could explain why the low support letter does
not perform worse in this setting. Our finding of a differential impact of
the two letters for long-term oriented firms supports the expectation that
especially those who value future interactions with the regulator are more
strongly influenced by a supportive regulatory strategy.
Our results contribute to different streams of literature. First, we con-
tribute to the theory of responsive regulation by providing evidence that
reporting quality differs for firms with different time horizons, and that
these differences can increase depending on the regulatory style that is
communicated to these firms. In addition, while there is a general pos-
itive stance toward supportive regulatory strategies and the benefits they
can provide, our findings provide no evidence of a direct positive effect
on firms’ reporting quality. This may relate to the nature of the industry
and the relationship between supervisor and market participants, which
seem to be important in considering the effects of such strategies. Second,
the results of our study contribute to the literature of regulatory reporting
in which field experiments are rare. We demonstrate that communication
alone may have an effect on reporting quality without actual differences in
regulatory strategy. This suggests that adapting responsive regulation strate-
gies across a wider setting of interactions between a supervisor and subsets
of firms may have stronger effects.
Our findings have three practical implications. First, they show that time
horizon is associated with firms’ reporting behavior. Authorities may use
this insight to differentiate between firms with different time horizons and,
for instance, target quality checks on self-assessment data particularly at
short-term oriented firms. Second, our findings show that the effect of a
high support letter on reporting quality differs with firms’ time horizon.
Authorities employing self-reporting as part of their regulatory strategy may
want to examine firms’ time horizon to decide how to present themselves
in official communications, and in considering their supervision strategy
and regulatory actions. Third, a high support strategy does not come with-
out risks. For example, a high support letter may evoke a weaker sense of
urgency and obligation, or send signals of weak enforcement capacity. Au-
thorities thus need to carefully consider when and for whom such strategies
can effectively be adopted.
Despite the fact that we find support for differentiating communica-
tion dependent on firms’ time horizon, several challenges remain. In the
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industry that we study, the intermediaries might on average still not per-
ceive the information that is collected by the MM as highly valuable. This
implies that the regulator could have a challenge to convince the market
about the relevance beyond the content of the letter. The fact that the letter
results in differences between firms is promising in the sense that targeted
supervision has upside potential. Future research could provide regulatory
authorities with more insight into the persistence of the observed effects.
Reusing these letters may become standard after a certain period of time,
potentially causing them to lose their effect. It may therefore be important
to adapt a support-based strategy for targeted firms over a wider range of
interactions. Future studies could also examine if and how other regula-
tory instruments, such as phone calls and audits, influence firms’ reporting
behavior. In addition, it may be highly relevant to examine to what extent
reporting behavior is related to other behavioral outcomes, such as com-
pliance with regulations. Examining the effects of low versus high support
letters on compliance, when these letters communicate the same require-
ments and expectations to firms, would provide valuable insights on how
perceived support interacts with the sense of obligation.
APPENDIX A
Translated Market Monitor Questions
This document provides translations of relevant questions in the Market
Monitor, which we use to measure the dependent, moderating, and con-
trol variables of interest. The original Dutch version of the Market Monitor
(Marktmonitor Adviseurs en Bemiddelaars) is available upon request, and on
the AFM’s website (https://www.afm.nl/nl-nl/professionals/doelgroepen/
adviseurs-bemiddelaars/thema/self-assessment).
Item 1.2: Reason why you have been inactive last year (situation)
You indicated that your firm did not provide financial services in part of
2016.
Which of the following situations applies to your firm?
Only one answer is possible.
 My firm started providing financial services in 2016
 My firm started providing financial services in 2017 (you only have
to fill in the number of full time employees and assert that you com-
pleted the Market Monitor truthfully)
 My firm temporarily stopped providing advisory and mediation activi-
ties in 2016
 My firm has not started providing financial services yet (you only have
to fill in the number of full time employees and assert that you com-
pleted the Market Monitor truthfully)
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 My firm stopped providing financial services in 2016 and did not man-
age client portfolios, or was not actively providing financial services
during 2016
Item 1.4: Product groups
For which product groups did your firm actively provide financial services
in 2016?




 Income insurance policies
 Damage insurance policies for private clients
 Damage insurance policies for corporate clients
 Capital products
 Health insurance policies
 Pension insurance policies
 Premium pension claims




Explanation: Your firm was actively providing financial services in 2016 if it advised,
mediated, or provided services as an authorized agent for a product group or if it
managed products of a particular product group from its portfolio. Having a license to
operate for certain product groups does not necessarily mean that your firm was
actively providing financial services for this product group. Your firm can have a license
for a product group, but not use it actively in practice. In that case, your firm has not
been active with that particular product group.
Item 1.11: Franchise
Was your firm a franchise holder or provider in 2016?
Only one answer is possible.
 Yes, my firm is a franchise holder
 Yes, my firm is a franchise provider
 No
Item 1.13: Affiliations to unions or trade associations
Was your firm and/or one or more of your employees an affiliated mem-
ber of a union, trade association, or content labeling and certification com-
pany in the sector of financial service providers?
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 Yes
 No
Item 1.18: Added value of your firm
Advisors and intermediaries often indicate that they cannot sufficiently
describe the character of their firm in the (standardized) Market Monitor.
For example, because a firm is small or traditional, or because it serves a
particular niche market. In order to help you to describe your firm, we
ask you this (non-compulsory) question. If you do not want to answer this
question, you can indicate so, and continue with the next question.
We ask you to describe in a maximum of 250 words how your firm differ-
entiated itself from fellow advisors and/or intermediaries in 2016.
Provide your answer.
 I do not want to answer this question
Item 2.11: Number of clients
How many private and corporate clients did your firm’s client portfolio
contain on December 31, 2016?
Fill in the number of clients (a rough estimation is sufficient).
Private clients
Corporate clients (including freelancers, DGA and collective arrange-
ments)
 My firm had more than 25 freelance clients in the client portfolio
 My firm had more than 5 collective arrangements in the client portfo-
lio
Explanation: One collective arrangement is counted as one client. If you do not have any
clients in one of the categories, fill in 0. When you do not know the exact number of
clients that your firm has, estimate it as accurately as possible. Pay attention to the
following: if your firm has more than 25 freelance and/or more than 5 collective arrangements
in its client portfolio, tick the corresponding box(es) above.
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Item 3.1: Type of employees
For each of the following statements, indicate if the situation applied to
your firm in 2016.
One answer per statement.
Yes No
My firm had employees on payroll
in 2016
 
My firm cooperated with
freelancers in 2016
 
My firm cooperated with
temporary employees in 2016
 
The employees of the firm were
the owners of the firm
 
Item 3.2.1 – 4: Number of employees
You indicated that in 2016, your firm had employees on payroll and/or
cooperated with freelancers and/or temporary employees.
State for each group, how many people were employed in your firm or
cooperated with your firm between January 1, 2016 and December 31, 2016.
Also state how many employees were hired and how many collaborations
started in 2016.
Fill in the number of employees
Employees involved
in financial services







January 1, 2016 December 31, 2016 Hired in 2016
Total number of
employees
Explanation: Pay attention to the following: Fill in the number of people, not the
number of full-time employees. For example: two people who both work 20 hours
per week count as two employees. If an employee distributes his or her activities
over financial services and non-financial services, you can allocate this person to
one type of activity based on your own knowledge. For example: if an employee
spent 10 hours of his or her time on non-financial services and 30 hours on
financial services, you should allocate the employee to ‘employees involved in
financial services’. Owners and/or policy makers, who work for the firm on basis
other than payroll are disregarded.
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Item 3.5: Expectation about number of employees for the next year
Do you expect the number of employees, freelancers and/or temporary
employees in your firm to increase, decrease or be stable in the next year?
One answer possible.
 The number of employees, freelancers and/or temporary employees
in my firm will increase
 The number of employees, freelancers and/or temporary employees
in my firm will remain stable
 The number of employees, freelancers and/or temporary employees
in my firm will decrease
Item 4.11: Number of new agreements through your firm
You indicated that on December 31, 2016 your firm cooperated with ser-
vice providers and/or authorized agents.
How many new agreements (not the prolongation of existing agree-
ments) did you sell via service providers and/or authorized agents in 2016?
Indicate the number of agreements sold through service providers
and/or authorized agents
Item 5.1: Number of advisory services provided
You indicated that your firm sold products in 2016 related to the service
provision items below.
For each item, state how many advisory services your firm provided in
2016 (in terms of the Financial Supervision Act—Wet financieel toezicht).
Fill in the number of advisory services per item.




Hedging risks (for impactful products or products with
a commission ban)
Borrowing money
Explanation: If you cannot provide exact numbers, it is sufficient to provide an
estimation. It is not relevant for this question whether the client followed the advice
and the advice resulted in a sale. You can also consult the definition of advisory
services (in terms of the Financial Supervision Act—Wet financieel toezicht) in the
glossary. WGA and WIA insurances are not included in the service provision item
‘hedging risks.’
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Item 5.2: Number of products sold
You indicated that your firm provided mediation services in 2016 for
products related to the product groups below.
How many products did your firm successfully provide mediation services
with in 2016?
Fill in the number for each product group.




Income insurance policies (excl. occupational disability
insurance policies)
Occupational disability insurance policies
Damage insurances for private clients
Damage insurances for corporate clients
Capital (excl. investment insurance policies, life insurance







Explanation: If you cannot specify exact numbers, it is sufficient to provide an
estimation. Does your firm bundle insurance policies in packages that you cannot
specify separately? Try to determine an average number of policies per package. For
example: Suppose your firm has 1,000 damage insurance policies, of which 200 are
bundled, and on average a bundled package has 2.5 policies. Then you fill in: 800 +
(200 ∗ 2.5) = 1,300 policies.
Item 5.5: Management of products
You indicated that your firm managed products for clients that are re-
lated to the product groups below.
How many products did your firm manage on December 31, 2016?
Fill in the number for each product group.
Number of products in management
Consumer credit
Mortgage credit
Income insurance policies (excl. occupational
disability insurance policies)
Occupational disability insurance policies
Damage insurances for private clients
Damage insurances for corporate clients
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Capital (excl. investment insurance policies, life








Explanation: If you cannot specify exact numbers, it is sufficient to provide an
estimation. Does your firm bundle insurance policies in packages that you
cannot specify separately? Try to determine an average number of policies per
package. For example: Suppose your firm has 1,000 damage insurance policies,
of which 200 are bundled, and on average a bundled package has 2.5 policies.
Then you fill in: 800 + (200 ∗ 2.5) = 1,300 policies.
Item 5.10: Total sales of financial activities billed
Indicate the total amount of sales∗ (other than provision and commis-
sion) that your firm billed to clients for providing advisory, mediation and




Excluding provision and commission
Excluding aftercare and service subscriptions
Fill in the amount per product group (round up to integers in euros).
Total amount billed for financial services
Consumer credit €
Mortgage credit €
Income insurance policies (excl. occupational
disability insurance policies)
€
Occupational disability insurance policies €
Damage insurances for private clients €
Damage insurances for corporate clients €
Capital (excl. investment insurance policies, life
insurance policies, and funeral insurance
policies)
€
Investment insurance policies €
Life insurance policies €
Funeral insurance policies €
Health insurance policies €
Pension insurance policies €
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Premium pension claims €
Participation rights in investment
companies—National regime
€
Explanation: If you simultaneously charged your client for services related to multiple
product groups, it is sufficient to provide an estimation of the billed amounts for
different product groups. If your firm only received provisions and/or
commissions, fill in 0.
Item 5.11: Provision of mediation services
You indicated that your firm provided mediation services in 2016 for the
product groups below. Furthermore, you indicated that your firm is com-
pensated for these services through provisions from the providers of finan-
cial products.
Provide the total amount of provisions per product group that your firm
received in 2016 from providers of financial products (or others than the
final client).




Income insurance policies (excl. occupational disability insurance
policies)
€
Occupational disability insurance policies €
Damage insurances for private clients €
Damage insurances for corporate clients €
Capital (excl. investment insurance policies, life insurance policies,
and funeral insurance policies)
€
Investment insurance policies €
Life insurance policies €
Funeral insurance policies €
Health insurance policies €
Pension insurance policies €
Premium pension claims €
Participation rights in investment companies—National regime €
(∗ and excluding insurance taxes)
Explanation: If you do not know the exact amount of provisions that your firm
received, estimate the received provisions as accurately as possible.
Item 5.18: Expectation of sales of advice/mediation services
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Do you expect the sales of advisory, mediation and/or other services pro-
vided by your firm to increase, decrease or be stable in 2017?
Only one answer possible.
 Sales of advisory, mediation and/or other services provided by my
firm will increase
 Sales of advisory, mediation and/or other services provided by my
firm will remain stable
 Sales of advisory, mediation and/or other services provided by my
firm will decrease
Item 6.1: Sales of financial services
What were your firm’s (gross) sales from providing financial services in
2016?
Fill in the sales below (round up to integers in euros).
e
Explanation: If you do not know the exact amount of sales, estimate it as accurately as
possible.
Item 6.2: Sales of other services
You indicated that your firm is also active in selling services other than
financial services.
What were your firm’s (gross) sales of other services in 2016?
Fill in the sales below (round up to whole euros).
e
Explanation: If you do not know the exact amount of sales, estimate it as accurately as
possible.
Item 8.1: Timely and clear information/Q&A
Do you agree with the following statements?
One answer possible.









Monitor in a timely
manner














    
Item 8.3: Contact with the help desk
Did your firm contact the help desk about the Market Monitor?
 Yes
 No
Item 8.5: Time to prepare and complete the Market Monitor
How much time did your firm need to prepare and complete the Market
Monitor?




Note: The original Dutch letters are available upon request.
HIGH SUPPORT
Instruction letter
Subject: Announcement 2017 Market Monitor for intermediaries
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Dear Sir, Madam,
Announcement
The Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) requests all intermedi-
aries with a license to complete a questionnaire every year. This question-
naire is called the Market Monitor. With this letter, we want to inform you that
you will soon receive the invitation to participate in the 2017 Market Monitor.
We realize that completing the yearly questionnaire requires a lot of your
time and attention. We would like to support you in this and with this letter
already inform you about the questionnaire and practical issues regarding
its completion. Below you will find the date from which you can start com-
pleting the questionnaire, information on the available time to complete it,
and information on what you can do to prepare.
The Market Monitor contributes to a well-functioning market for interme-
diaries
The Market Monitor is important for the supervision activities of the AFM.
With our supervision activities we aim for, among other things, honest and
transparent financial markets. The information that intermediaries pro-
vide, helps us to get a better insight into this market. This allows us to target
the AFM’s supervision of risks and trends in the market or developments
within individual firms. The information therefore contributes to a well-
functioning market for intermediaries. For this goal, your contribution of
accurately and timely completing the Market Monitor is important.
Request supervision fees measure
As last year, the request for the “supervision fee measure” is included in
the Market Monitor. With your responses, the AFM assesses the 2017 super-
vision fees for your firm. This year, there is a possibility to choose the most
appropriate measurement basis for your firm:
 The number of full-time employees at December 31 of the previous
year
 The average number of full-time employees over the previous year.
This average is calculated by adding the number of full-time employees
at March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31 and dividing
the obtained number by 4.
More information is available in the Market Monitor.
Did your firm revoke its AFM-license in 2017?
Even if your firm revoked its AFM license in 2017, it is necessary to com-
plete the Market Monitor. In this case, we limited the number of questions
you need to complete. One of the questions concerns the measurement
basis for supervision fees.
Your data is handled confidentially
We treat your data confidentially. This implies, among other things,
that when we share data with third parties (for example in the form of
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publications of market analyses), it is never possible, nor allowed, to trace
data back to your firm. If the AFM shares information about the Market
Monitor with the public or third parties via, for example, electronic news-
letters about intermediaries, this will only be on market level.
When can you complete the questionnaire and how much time do you
have to do that?
If you have any questions, we would like to help you as quickly and as ef-
fectively as possible. To be better accessible for your questions, we divided
all, approximately 7,500, intermediaries who participate in the Market Mon-
itor into three groups. This improves our accessibility in case of questions.
Your firm is in group [X].
We open your questionnaire on [DATE]. You have five weeks to complete
and submit the questionnaire. A number of days in advance you will receive
the information that you need to log in (one letter with your username and
another letter with your password). With this information you can open,
complete, and submit the questionnaire.
We want to support you in preparing for the Market Monitor
We realize that completing the yearly questionnaire requires a lot of
your time and attention. To support you as much as possible in preparing
for the Market Monitor, we provided necessary information on our website
www.afm.nl/marktmonitor-ab. Among other things, you will find a printed
version of the questionnaire on this website. Please note that this is a con-
cept version and that the final questionnaire may contain changes.
Do you have any questions? We are here to help you!
As mentioned above, you can find more information about the 2017 Mar-
ket Monitor at http://www.afm.nl/marktmonitor-ab. Of course, you can also
contact ‘het Ondernemersloket’. ‘Het Ondernemersloket’ can be reached
on working days from 10.00 until 17.00 via the phone number 0800–6800
680 (free of charge) or by e-mail (ondernemersloket@afm.nl).
We thank you in advance for completing the Market Monitor and for your con-
tribution to a well-functioning market for financial intermediaries.
Kind regards,
The Authority for the Financial Markets
First and surnames of AFM representatives
Username letter
Subject: Invitation 2017 Market Monitor for intermediaries (with user-
name)
Dear Sir, Madam,
On [DATE] the Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) sent you a
letter in which it announced the 2017 Market Monitor for intermediaries.
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Via this letter, we send you the link and username you need to log in. We
also summarize other important information for you.
We want to be as accessible as possible in case you have questions. That
is why we divided the, approximately 7,500, intermediaries who participate
in the Market Monitor into three groups. Your firm is in group [X].
How do you complete the Market Monitor?
From [DATE] you can complete the questionnaire via www.afm.nl/
marktmonitor-ab. In order to complete the questionnaire you need a user-
name and a password. Please find the username below. You will receive the
password in a separate letter within a few days.
Username——[Username]
Until which date do you have to complete the Market Monitor?
The deadline for your group is [DATE]. It is possible to save the ques-
tionnaire while you are working on it, so you do not have to complete the
questionnaire at once.
We realize that completing the yearly questionnaire requires a lot of your
time and attention. The information is important for us to maintain a well-
functioning market for intermediaries. This is why it is important that you
complete the Market Monitor timely, truthfully, and comprehensively.
We thank you in advance for your participation.
Questions? We are here to help you!
We hope that you are already well-informed by the instruction letter and
our website www.afm.nl/marktmonitor-ab, but of course we are available
for help.
In case you have questions, you can contact ‘het Ondernemersloket’. Het
Ondernemersloket’ can be reached on working days from 10.00 until 17.00
via the phone number 0800–6800 680 (free of charge). ‘Het Ondernemer-
sloket’ is also accessible via e-mail: ondernemersloket@afm.nl.
Kind regards,
The Authority for the Financial Markets
First and surnames of AFM representatives
Password letter
Subject: Invitation Market Monitor for intermediaries 2017 (with pass-
word)
Dear Sir, Madam,
We informed you at an earlier stage about completing the 2017 Market
Monitor. In a previous letter, you already received your username. In this
letter, you receive your password so that you can start the questionnaire.
Password———[Password]
514 S. R. VAN DUIN, H. C. DEKKER, J. L. WIELHOUWER, AND J. P. MENDOZA
We want to remind you that it is possible to save your progress so that you
do not have to complete the questionnaire at once.
You can complete the questionnaire from [DATE] until [DATE] via
www.afm.nl/marktmonitor-ab.
Questions? We are here to help!
We hope that the instruction letter, letter with username, and
www.afm.nl/marktmonitor-ab informed you sufficiently and in a timely
manner. If you still have questions, our employees at the ‘Ondernemer-
sloket’ are available for your questions. ‘Het Ondernemersloket’ can be
reached on working days from 10.00 until 17.00 via the phone number
0800–6800 680 (free of charge). ‘Het Ondernemersloket’ is also accessible
via e-mail: ondernemersloket@afm.nl.
We thank you in advance for your cooperation and contribution to a well-
functioning market for intermediaries.
Kind regards,
The Authority for the Financial Markets
First and surnames of AFM representatives
LOW SUPPORT
Instruction letter
Subject: Announcement 2017 Market Monitor for intermediaries
Dear Sir, Madam,
The Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) requests all intermedi-
aries to complete a questionnaire every year. You will be invited to par-
ticipate in the 2017 Market Monitor. It is legally required to complete this
questionnaire.
Below you find more information about the planning of and preparation
for the questionnaire.
Request supervision fees measure
As last year, the request for the “supervision fee measure” is included in
the Market Monitor. With your responses, the AFM assesses the 2017 super-
vision fees for your firm. This year, there is a possibility to choose the most
appropriate measurement basis for your firm:
 The number of full-time employees at December 31 of the previous
year
 The average number of full-time employees over the previous year.
This average is calculated by adding the number of full-time employees
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at March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31 and dividing
the obtained number by 4.
More information is available in the Market Monitor.
Did your firm revoke its AFM-license in 2017?
Even if your firm revoked its AFM license in 2017, you are still obliged
to complete the Market Monitor. In this case, it is sufficient to complete a
number of questions, one of which is the measurement basis for supervision
fees.
Confidentiality of data provided
We treat your data confidentially. This implies, among other things, that
when we share data with third parties (for example in the form of publica-
tions of market analyses), it is never possible to trace data back to your firm.
If the AFM shares information about the Market Monitor with the public or
third parties via, for example, electronic newsletters about intermediaries,
this will only be on market level.
Planning
We divided all, approximately 7,500, intermediaries who participate in
the Market Monitor into three groups. Your firm is in group [X].
From [DATE] the AFM opens the questionnaire digitally. You have five
weeks to complete and submit the questionnaire. The deadline to complete
and submit the questionnaire is thus [DATE]. A number of days in advance
you will receive the information you need to log in (one letter with your
username and another letter with your password). With this data you can
open, complete, and submit the questionnaire.
Preparation
On our website www.afm.nl/marktmonitor-ab, you find more informa-
tion on how to prepare for the Market Monitor. Among other things, you
will find a printed version of the questionnaire on this website. Please note
that this is a concept version and that the final questionnaire may contain
changes.
Questions?
If you still have questions after reading this information, you can con-
tact ‘het Ondernemersloket’. ‘Het Ondernemersloket’ can be reached on
working days from 10.00 until 17.00 via the phone number 0800–6800 680
(free of charge) or by e-mail (ondernemersloket@afm.nl).
Yours sincerely,
The Authority for the Financial Markets
Titles, initials and surnames of AFM representatives
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Username letter
Subject: Invitation 2017 Market Monitor for intermediaries (with user-
name)
Dear Sir, Madam,
On [DATE] the Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) sent you a
letter in which it announced the 2017 Market Monitor for intermediaries.
With this letter, we request you to complete the Market Monitor.
The AFM divided the, approximately 7,500, intermediaries who partici-
pate in the Market Monitor in three groups. Your firm is in group [X].
How do you complete the Market Monitor?
From [DATE] you can complete the questionnaire via www.afm.nl/
marktmonitor-ab. In order to complete the questionnaire you need data
to log in (a username and a password). Please find the username below.
You will receive the password in a separate letter within a few days.
Username———[Username]
Before which date do you have to complete the Market Monitor?
The deadline for your group is [DATE]. It is possible to save your
progress on the questionnaire.
You are obliged to complete the questionnaire. It is important you com-
plete it timely, truthfully, and comprehensively.
Questions?
For more information, we refer to the instruction letter and
www.afm.nl/marktmonitor-ab.
Would you still have questions after reading this information, you can
contact ‘het Ondernemersloket’. Het Ondernemersloket’ can be reached
on working days from 10.00 until 17.00 via the phone number 0800–6800
680 (free of charge) or by e-mail (ondernemersloket@afm.nl).
Yours sincerely,
The Authority for the Financial Markets
Titles, initials and surnames of AFM representatives
Password letter
Subject: Invitation 2017 Market Monitor for intermediaries (with pass-
word)
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Dear Sir, Madam,
With this letter, we request you to complete the 2017 Market Monitor. In an
earlier letter, you already received your username. In this letter, you receive
your password.
Password———[Password]
It is obligatory to complete the questionnaire. It is possible to save your
progress on the questionnaire.
You can complete the questionnaire from [DATE] via www.afm.nl/
marktmonitor-ab. It needs to be submitted no later than [DATE].
Questions?
For more information, refer to the instruction letter, letter with user-
name and www.afm.nl/marktmonitor-ab.
If you still have questions after reading this information, you can contact
‘het Ondernemersloket’. Het Ondernemersloket’ can be reached on work-
ing days from 10.00 until 17.00 via the phone number 0800–6800 680 (free
of charge). ‘Het Ondernemersloket’ is also accessible via e-mail: onderne-
mersloket@afm.nl.
Yours sincerely,
The Authority for the Financial Markets
Titles, initials, and surnames of AFM representatives.
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